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861
Giving Local Municipalities the Power 
to Affect the National Securities 
Market 
WHY THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN TO TAKE 
MORTGAGES SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO GREATER 
REGULATION 
INTRODUCTION 
The power of eminent domain is one of the oldest and 
most controversial sovereign rights1 by which governments can 
relieve citizens of their property without their permission.2 While 
the most common use of eminent domain is for governmental 
seizure of real property—land and buildings3—the power has 
been broadly interpreted to reach many other forms of property, 
including both the tangible and the intangible.4 Furthermore, 
while eminent domain is grounded in the sovereignty of the 
individual states, each state has delegated this power to local 
governments,5 including some of “the smallest government 
entities like townships and school districts.”6 Thus, as the 
power is more broadly dispersed and its reach expanded, the 
threat to citizens’ property rights is arguably increased.7 
 
 1 See 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 3 (2012); see also 26 AM. JUR. 2D 
Eminent Domain § 21 (2012) (addressing the possession of “the sovereign power of 
eminent domain” by the states). 
 2 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 3, supra note 1.  
 3 David C. John, San Bernardino County’s Loan Seizures Would Destroy Its 
Mortgage Market Just as Housing Starts to Recover, HERITAGE FOUND. (July 13, 2012), 
http://report.heritage.org/ib3665 (“Eminent domain is usually used to take property 
that is in the way of a proposed road, government building, or similar project . . . .”). 
 4 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 51 (2012). 
 5 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 23 (2012). Eminent domain is also grounded 
in the sovereignty of the federal government, which in turn has the ability to delegate the 
power to its agencies. See 7 FED. PROC., L. ED. Condemnation of Property § 14:1. 
 6 MICHAEL SAUVANTE, EMINENT DOMAIN: HOW TO USE EMINENT DOMAIN TO 
STOP FORECLOSURES, RESCUE HOMEOWNERS AND SAVE COMMUNITIES 2 (Vari MacNeil 
ed., 2012). 
 7 Senate Representative from Idaho, Jim Guthrie, introduced a bill to 
increase the number of checks placed on local governments to use the power of eminent 
domain to take the property of their constituents, on the basis that the local 
governments had been granted too much autonomy over decisions to use the power of 
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Citizens are not left entirely unprotected. The Fifth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution limits the exercise of 
eminent domain to “property acquired . . . for a ‘public use’” for 
which “just compensation” is paid.8 Any governmental seizure 
that does not meet these requirements is deemed an 
unconstitutional taking.9 However, this constitutional provision 
has proven to be unreliable in protecting property rights.10 The 
Supreme Court has increasingly and unpredictably interpreted 
the public use requirement more liberally, granting significant 
deference to the government’s determinations of what 
constitutes a suitable public use.11 
At the same time, the states have maintained a policy of 
liberally granting eminent domain authority to local 
governments, arguably valuing the reduced responsibility of 
overseeing “the appropriation of property in every instance”12 
above the increased threat to individual citizens’ property rights 
and the lost ability to regulate local policy-making. Because the 
power of eminent domain is delegated through legislation, the 
states (or federal government) must use legislative means to limit 
an otherwise constitutional exercise of the power by authorized 
public sub-entities.13 Thus, without legislating otherwise, the 
states do not have the authority to overturn local government 
decisions to exercise eminent domain. 
The collective impact of the use of eminent domain 
power to seize more complex categories of properties, and the 
nebulousness and narrowed scope of the Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                                     
eminent domain. Jim Guthrie, Eminent Domain is a Threat, IDAHO STATE J. POL. (Apr. 
1, 2011, 4:19 PM), http://www.pocatelloshops.com/new_blogs/politics/?p=7764. 
 8 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 6 (2012) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V). 
 9 See 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 6, supra note 8. 
 10 CATO INST., CATO HANDBOOK FOR POLICYMAKERS 345 (David Boaz ed., 
7th ed. 2008). 
 11 Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of Deference in Judicial Review of Public Use 
Determinations, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 243, 261-62 (2012). Each State 
Constitution has its own variety of the Fifth Amendment “takings” clause, to which the 
exercise of eminent domain by an entity within the state must conform. Some of these 
state clauses are slightly more restrictive, but they do not vary significantly enough 
from the Fifth Amendment to warrant additional discussion for the purposes of this 
note. 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 67 (2012); 32 TEX. JUR. 3D Eminent Domain § 125 
(2013). Furthermore, federal constitutional law is the law of last resort, which sets the 
outtermost boundaries of constitutional law for the American people (and thus the 
state governments). Hence, this note will focus on the Federal Constitution “takings” 
clause as a common point of reference for takings law applicable to all of the states. See 
Joseph Blocher, What State Constitutional Law Can Tell Us About the Federal 
Constitution, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 1035, 1035 (2011); infra Part III for further 
discussion of the parameters of current takings law under the Fifth Amendment. 
 12 51 N.Y. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 13 (2013). 
 13 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 37 (2012). 
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interpretations of the Fifth Amendment limitations, should stir 
the states to review this value structure.14 A hedge fund 
proposal for local governments to use the power of eminent 
domain to seize underwater mortgages15 provides a perfect case 
study on the dangers posed by local governments’ use of 
eminent domain to take complex securities. The proposal, 
currently being considered by several counties and cities across 
the nation, presents an unprecedented use of eminent domain 
to take mortgages without a concomitant taking of the land to 
which the mortgage is attached.16 
The proposal, donned the “Homeownership Protection 
Program,”17 comes years into and in response to an ongoing 
“foreclosure crisis” that has forced millions of American 
homeowners “underwater” on their mortgages.18 The crux of the 
proposal is to force the banking industry to significantly reduce 
the principal owed on selected underwater mortgages by 
compelling them to part with the mortgages for just compensation 
payments that proponents estimate will be even less than the 
current market value of the attached homes.19 Under the plan, 
participating cities will refinance possessed mortgages to closer 
match the homes’ market value, while also securing federal 
backing for the loans, thus “leaving the homeowner with a 
 
 14 Guthrie, supra note 7. 
 15 Bos. Herald Editorial Staff, Mortgages No Game, BOS. HERALD (July 15, 
2012), http://bostonherald.com/news_opinion/opinion/editorials/2012/07/mortgages_no_
game; see also MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, HOMEOWNERSHIP PROTECTION 
PROGRAM: A SOLUTION TO A CRITICAL PROBLEM 4, available at http://op.bna.com/
der.nsf/r?Open=sfre-8wdqld (last visited Nov. 19, 2013). 
 16 In the past, mortgages have been extinguished by a concomitant taking of 
the property to which they are attached, but nonetheless satisfied out of the just 
compensation award for the property. As a result, some authorities have referred to 
this process as seizure of the mortgage by eminent domain. See 26 AM. JUR. 2D 
Eminent Domain § 240 (2013); 154 A.L.R. 1110 (1945). However, under the mortgage 
proposal, “the actual property would not be touched[; only] the mortgage itself that was 
used to finance its purchase would be seized.” John, supra note 3. 
 17 MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, supra note 15 at 1. See infra Part I for 
a detailed explanation of the proposal. 
 18 MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, http://mortgageresolution.com/ (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2013). A “borrower is said to be holding an underwater mortgage” 
“when [the] mortgage loan is more than the value of the home.” What is an Underwater 
Mortgage, GOBANKINGRATES.COM (July 8, 2010), http://www.gobankingrates.com/
mortgage-rates/what-is-an-underwater-mortgage/. For a discussion on the mortgage 
crisis and the role underwater and defaulted mortgages play in the crisis, see Robert 
Hockett, Breaking the Mortgage Debt Impasse: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings and 
Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation, and Local 
Economic Recovery at 4-14 [hereinafter Hockett Memo], available at http://online.wsj.com/
public/resources/documents/EMINENT-legal-brief.pdf (visited Aug. 24, 2012). 
 19 John, supra note 3 (noting that an underwater property “is worth less than 
it was when the mortgage was first made”). 
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mortgage insured by the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) and owing less” on their home mortgage.20 
The mortgage industry has predictably pushed back on 
the proposal since San Bernardino County and two of its cities, 
Ontario and Fontana, showed signs of interest in 2012.21 The 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)22 openly expressed its 
“significant concerns about the use of eminent domain to revise 
existing financial contracts,” and the negative response it could 
and already had invoked from the lending community.23 Both 
the FHFA and the private banking and investment industry, 
asserting strong positions against the constitutionality of the 
proposal,24 threatened legal and institutional action if the 
proposal were to move forward.25 These threats have been 
 
 20 John, supra note 3. Proponents argue that this procedure will likely secure 
the purported goal as “those who owe more than the[ir] house is worth are more liable 
to end up in foreclosure.” Id. Furthermore, “by reducing foreclosures, they hope to 
stabilize neighborhoods, since a foreclosure is likely to result in reducing the property 
values of the homes around it.” Id. 
 21 Amy Loftsgordon, The Underwater Mortgage Problem: A Solution in 
California? San Bernardino County, Ontario, and Fontana Have Proposed a Way to Help 
Underwater Homeowners, NOLO, LAW FOR ALL, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/
the-underwater-mortgage-problem-a-solution-california.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2013). 
 22 In a notice dated August 9, 2012, the agency stated: 
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) oversees the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the Federal Home Loan Banks (Banks). 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the Enterprises) are operating in 
conservatorships with a core mission of supporting the housing market. 
FHFA’s obligations, as conservator, are to preserve and conserve assets of the 
Enterprises and to minimize costs to taxpayers. The Enterprises purchase a 
large portion of the mortgages originated in the United States and they hold 
private label mortgage backed securities containing pools of non-Enterprise 
loans. The Banks likewise have important holdings of such securities. In 
addition, the Banks accept collateral that consists of mortgages of member 
financial firms pledged in exchange for advances of funds. 
Notice on Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg. 
47652 (Aug. 9, 2012) [hereinafter FHFA 2012 Notice], available at www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-08-09/pdf/2012-19566.pdf. 
 23 Id. 
 24 See Jayant W. Tambe et al., They Can’t Do That, Can They? Constitutional 
Limitations on the Seizure of Underwater Mortgages, JONES DAY COMMENTARY (June 
2012), available at http://www.jonesday.com/they_cant_do_that/; Memorandum from 
Walter Dellinger et al., O’Melveny & Myers LLP, to Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association 6 (July 16, 2012) [hereinafter O’Melveny Memo], available at 
http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id =8589939523 (commissioned by the Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)). 
 25 See David Dayen, Financial Services Industry Threatens Retaliation at 
Municipalities Who Use Eminent Domain to Fix the Housing Crisis, FDL NEWS DESK 
(July 20, 2012, 8:55 AM), http://news.firedoglake.com/2012/07/20/financial-services-
industry-threatens-retaliation-at-municipalities-who-use-eminent-domain-to-fix-the-
housing-crisis/; Matthew Goldstein & Jennifer Ablan, California County Began Eminent 
Domain talks in Secret, REUTERS (JULY 13, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/
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made good in response to the City of Richmond’s 2013 approval 
of the proposal.26 The FHFA has renewed its institutional 
threats27 and both the city and Mortgage Resolution Partners 
(MRP), the hedge fund that put forward the plan and will be 
financing the takings,28 now face lawsuits from key players in 
the banking industry.29 
The mortgage industry’s response has some merit beyond 
institutional preservation. The proposal poses consequences that 
reach beyond the generally limited effect of a taking on an 
individual property owner.30 The danger of the proposal lies in the 
multilayered ownership structure of most mortgages in the 
United States. Most American mortgages are securitized.31 
Securitized mortgages are those which are “held by trusts” and 
organized into mortgage pools in which “thousands of investors” 
purchase and hold shares.32 As a result, any individual mortgage-
taking under eminent domain would impact a broad cross-section 
of investors, many of whom would be located beyond the borders 
of any individual municipality.33 Furthermore, the mortgage 
banks have come to depend on the purchase of these loans by 
securitization trusts to continue extending substantial amounts 
of credit.34 In its simplest iteration, the shares of mortgage-backed 
                                                                                                                                     
2012/07/13/us-sanbernardino-eminentdomain-idUSBRE86C14K20120713; Al Yoon, New 
Roadblock for Eminent Domain Bid: Housing Regulator, WSJ BLOG, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 
8, 2012, 3:02 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2012/08/08 /new-roadblock-for-
eminent-domain-bid-housing-regulator/; see also infra Part III for some of the arguments 
and threats made by the banking industry. 
 26 Alejandro Lazo, U.S. Warns Against Eminent-Domain Mortgage Seizures, L.A. 
TIMES (Aug. 8, 2013, 7:41 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-eminent-domain-
lawsuit-20130809,0,6390434.story. 
 27 Id. 
 28 MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, supra note 15 at 9. 
 29 Alejandro Lazo, Mortgage Holders Sue Richmond Over Eminent Domain 
Plan, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2013, 7:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-
mo-eminent-domain-20130807,0,5887956.story. 
 30 See infra Part III addressing some of these consequences. 
 31 Andreas Fuster & James Vickery, Securitization and the Fixed Rate Mortgage, 
594 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORT 1 (Jan. 2013), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr594.pdf (“Even in the wake of the 
subprime crisis, most U.S. mortgages are pooled into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) . . . .”). 
 32 Imran Ghori, San Bernardino County: Mortgage Aid Expanded, PRESS-
ENTERPRISE (Sept. 6, 2012, 6:55 PM), http://www.pe.com/local-news/politics/imran-
ghori-headlines/20120906-san-bernardino-county-mortgage-aid-expanded.ece. 
 33 See, e.g., Mark Fogarty, Pension Fund Power to Explode in Mortgage 
Market, AM. BANKER (Jan. 16, 2013, 2:00 AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/magazine/
110_11/-137045-1.html?zkPrintable=1&nopagination=1; see also Mathias Hoffmann & 
Thomas Nitschka, Financial Globalization and Securitization in Mortgage Markets, VOX 
(June 20, 2009), http://www.voxeu.org/article/macroeconomic-benefits-mortgage-backed-
securities (indicating the international nature of the securitized mortgage market). 
 34 See generally Letter from Tom Deutsch, Deputy Executive Director, American 
Securitization Forum to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 2, 
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securities are valued based on the range of quality of the 
mortgages pooled together to spread the risk of default.35 As a 
result, banks are able to market loans that otherwise would be 
considered unmarketable, and are able to “continue to provide 
credit to consumers even in downturns, thus effectively providing 
consumption risk sharing to private households.”36 Thus, any 
threat levied at these trusts is arguably also a threat to both the 
local, national, and even international mortgage markets.37 
As this note will show, however, despite heated arguments 
to the contrary,38 the mortgage proposal is likely constitutional 
under current takings law,39 and the constitutional debate over 
the proposal has been merely a necessary pretext to underlying 
fundamental differences in opinion on the wisdom of using 
eminent domain to address the foreclosure crisis. Opponents and 
proponents of the proposal have, first and foremost, made policy 
arguments that are unsurprisingly aligned with their positions on 
its constitutionality.40 Parties have likely nevertheless argued 
over the constitutionality of the proposal both out of recognition 
that the Fifth Amendment is a legal hurdle the proposal must 
pass, and that there will be no other potential recourse for 
mortgagees if the proposal is in fact implemented. As mentioned 
earlier in this introduction, local control over policy decisions 
pertaining to the use of eminent domain has been endemic to the 
states’ delegation of this power. But the complex nature of the 
mortgage market raises the stakes of such a policy decision 
                                                                                                                                     
2010) [hereinafter ASF Letter], available at http://www.americansecuritization.com/
uploadedFiles/ASFRegABIICommentLetter8.2.10.pdf. 
 35 “[B]uyers of mortgage-backed securities can take security in the knowledge 
that the value of the bond doesn’t just rest on the creditworthiness of one borrower, but 
on the collective creditworthiness of a group of borrowers.” Chris Wilson, What is a 
Mortgage-backed Security? The financial Instrument That Destroyed Bear Sterns, 
SLATE (Mar. 17, 2008, 7:09 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
explainer/2008/03/what _is_a_ mortgagebacked_security.html. 
 36 Hoffman & Nitschka, supra note 33. 
 37 Letter from Am. Bankers Ass’n to Alfred Pollard, Gen. Counsel Fed. 
Housing Fin. Agency (Sept. 7, 2012) [hereinafter ABA Letter]. 
 38 See David J. Reiss, Comment on the Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure 
Performing Loans, BROOK. L. SCHOOL RESEARCH PAPERS WORKING PAPER SERIES (2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144786; see also Hockett Memo, supra note 18. 
 39 See infra Part II. 
 40 For example, the vast majority of Cornell Law Professor Robert Hockett’s 
lengthy article on the proposal deals exclusively with policy arguments in support of 
the proposal. Hockett Memo, supra note 18. Conversely, the most prominent and 
detailed statements against the proposal’s constitutionality have been issued by law 
firms commissioned by members of the banking and investment industries to 
supplement their policy arguments in opposition. See generally Tambe et al., supra 
note 24; O’Melveny Memo, supra note 24 (commissioned by the Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)). 
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significantly,41 and lends credence to many of the concerns 
voiced by the banking and investment industries. 
Through an examination of MRP’s mortgage-seizure 
proposal, this note argues that, though likely constitutional 
under current law, municipal use of eminent domain to take 
complex forms of property, such as mortgage securities, should be 
subject to greater regulation. Part I of this note will introduce 
MRP and discuss the details of the proposal through a brief 
recounting of the controversy surrounding it. Part II will 
delineate the constitutional arguments against the MRP proposal 
itself and those against mortgage takings by municipal 
governments, showing that, at least under current Supreme 
Court takings doctrine, mortgage takings and even the MRP 
proposal are likely constitutional. Part III will discuss some of the 
potential incidental effects such takings could have on the 
mortgage securities market, arguing that mortgage takings 
require greater governance than current takings law provides. 
And finally, Part IV will propose potential governmental action 
that could be taken to address this lack of governance issue. 
I. MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS AND THEIR “HOME 
OWNERSHIP PROTECTION PROGRAM” 
MRP, a private California company, was formed in January 
2012 with the goal of implementing their “Home Ownership 
Protection Program,” a mortgage seizure proposal which the 
company claims will “stabilize local housing markets and 
economies by keeping as many homeowners with underwater 
mortgages in their homes as possible.”42 The company’s plan is 
easily summarized: “form[ ]  partnerships with local governments”43 
to seize underwater mortgages, such that the government can 
refinance them into new federally guaranteed loans to be resold to 
MRP’s “large, private sector investors.”44 These investors will 
provide the necessary funding for the takings as well as pay MRP’s 
per mortgage service fee in exchange for securities in pools of the 
 
 41 See Yves Smith, The Mortgage Condemnation Plan: Fleecing Municipalities 
as Well as Investors (Updated), NAKED CAPITALISM (July 11, 2012, 5:14 AM), 
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2012/07/the-mortgage-condemnation-plan-fleecing-
municipalities-as-well-as-investors.html#cf141uF4t4SmrIaT.99 (commenting that there is a 
“general tendency of municipalities to be easy prey for clever bankers”). 
 42 MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, http://mortgageresolution.com/ (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2013). 
 43 Id. at 9. 
 44 Id. at 4. 
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restructured FHA-backed loans.45 While the members of the 
investment community that stand to lose their property are 
understandably less than enthused about the plan’s 
implementation, there are details of the plan that have 
otherwise raised eyebrows and attracted opposition. A large part 
of the controversy surrounding the proposal is the enormous 
profit MRP and its investors stand to gain if they are selected by 
local governments as partners for the venture.46 MRP will secure 
this profit through a combination of the type of loans it proposes 
to target—those held in privately securitized trusts that are 
underwater but performing (that is, “not in default”)47—and the 
low just compensation payments it predicts will be owed for the 
mortgages. Though MRP has subsequently reported, in an 
attempt to quell the cries of foul play, that the program will be 
open to some defaulted loans,48 by all accounts, non-defaulted 
loans will still be the greater and earlier targeting priority.49 
Moreover, MRP has not budged on its borrower requirement that 
only borrowers “with the ability and creditworthiness to make 
payments on their restructured loans” will qualify for the 
program.50 
By limiting its selection to performing loans, MRP is 
securing a quality of loan that is more likely to remain 
performing, particularly with the decrease in principal that 
 
 45 Id. 
The Federal Housing Administration, generally known as ‘FHA’, provides 
mortgage insurance on loans made by FHA-approved lenders throughout the 
United States and its territories. FHA insures mortgages on single family 
and multifamily homes including manufactured homes and hospitals. It is 
the largest insurer of mortgages in the world, insuring over 34 million 
properties since its inception in 1934. 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA), HUD.GOV, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/
HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/fhahistory (last visited Nov. 11, 2012). It is difficult 
to imagine how the cities will attain this federal backing for these seized loans in light 
of the response from the FHFA, which has included threats to boycott jurisdictions that 
implement this plan. Federal Housing Finance Agency, FHFA Statement on Eminent 
Domain (Aug. 8, 2013) [hereinafter FHFA Statement], available at http://www.fhfa.gov/
webfiles/25419/FHFAStmtEminentDomain080813.pdf. 
 46 Hudson Sangree, Experts Debate Legality of Plan to Apply Eminent 
Domain to Mortgages, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 17, 2012 at A1, available at 
http://www.loansafe.org/experts-debate-legality-of-plan-to-apply-eminent-domain-to-
mortgages (“The fees and profits could add up to tens of millions of dollars in 
Sacramento County alone.”). 
 47 MRP and its investors “preliminarily screen[ ]  for loans qualifying for 
modification and refinancing” prior to the seizures. MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, 
supra note 15, at 9. 
 48 See Ghori, supra note 32. 
 49 See MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, supra note 15, at 9. 
 50 Id. at 4. 
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will result from the proposed refinancing. Furthermore, by 
requiring the cities to secure FHA backing for the loans,51 the 
value of the loans to MRP’s investors and in the mortgage 
market will greatly increase. This is because federally backed 
loans guarantee shareholders timely dividend payments 
irrespective of whether mortgagors make their monthly mortgage 
payments.52 In other words, the FHA takes on the risk of 
individual mortgage default. In contrast, “[p]rivate label mortgage 
securities . . . are the sole obligation of their issuer and are not 
guaranteed by any governmental entity.”53 As a result, private 
label mortgage-backed securities are more risky, as well as 
cheaper for and less valuable to investors than their federally 
backed counterparts.54 The potential profit to be made is 
exponentially larger if MRP’s prediction of the just compensation 
purchase price is correct—“a purchase price [of] between 75-80% 
of the homes’ market value.”55 However, even if the municipalities 
do not secure this low price, as critics submit they won’t, FHA 
backing will secure for MRP investors a significant profit on these 
loans. In essence, MRP is facilitating the purchase of more 
valuable FHA-backed mortgages at the discounted price of their 
private-label alternatives. 
MRP and its proponents have defended private-sector 
funding, and hence involvement, as necessary to the financing of 
the program, and have touted that, to the benefit of the American 
public, the initiative will not involve any taxpayer dollars.56 
Indeed none have questioned the program’s unaffordability for 
targeted cities acting on their own. Expectedly, most of the cities 
that have suffered the worst from the mortgage crisis are also 
under critical financial constraints.57 Some skeptics, however, 
 
 51 See id. at 4 (“[G]overnments will be able to restructure the mortgage loans 
acquired th[r]ough eminent domain and refinance severely underwater 
homeowners . . . into new loans to be sold to large, private sector investors as FHA 
GinnieMae securities.”).  
 52 FANNIE MAE, BASICS OF FANNIE MAE SINGLE-FAMILY MBS 1, available at 
http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/mbs/pdf/basics-sf-mbs.pdf. 
 53 BOND MARKET ASSOCIATION, AN INVESTOR’S GUIDE TO PASS-THROUGH AND 
COLLATERALIZED MORTGAGE SECURITIES 12 (1997), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/
mbs/docs/about_MBS.pdf. 
 54 Indeed, after the mortgage market crashed in 2008, the market for these so 
called “private-label mortgages” became and continues to be, as one journalist put it, 
“moribund.” Joe Nucera, The End of Fannie and Freddie?, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2013). 
 55 O’Melveny Memo, supra note 24, at 6. 
 56 According to MRP, “[n]o taxpayer funds will be used in connection with the 
Program.” Id. 
 57 Riverside, California, is listed as both one of the top 100 cities that 
continues to suffer the worst from the financial crisis in 2012, as well as one of the 
worst managed cities in the country. Foreclosures: 100 Hardest Hit Neighborhoods, 
CNN Money, http://money.cnn.com/interactive/real-estate/foreclosure-rate/2013/ (last 
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have expressed doubt over whether MRP’s proposal can be 
implemented as free of any public tax burden as the company has 
promised. For example, Laurie Nelson of Dechert LLP 
commented that, “if courts ultimately find that the fair market 
values for the mortgage notes are substantially different than 
MRP’s valuation, [participating municipalities] may well be 
liable for paying the difference to the securitization trusts as 
just compensation.”58 
The uncertainty, evoked in Ms. Nelson’s statement, as 
to whether MRP will pay more than they would like is 
predicated on MRP’s proposal that local governments utilize 
“quick take” condemnation proceedings to seize the 
mortgages.59 “Quick take” proceedings will allow the 
government to seize and dispose of mortgages prior to a 
determination by the court as to whether the seizure is 
permissible.60 Part of the procedure is placing an appraised 
value of the seized property in trust with the court.61 Walter 
Dellinger of O’Melveny & Myers argues that “the proposal 
clearly does not contemplate raising and holding in reserve 
until all litigation is concluded funds that are sufficient to 
compensate the trusts for the full value of the notes . . . .”62 
MRP estimates that the courts will discount the mortgage 
values for the likelihood of default, telling investors to expect 
to pay a value significantly less than that of the underlying 
homes.63 However, it is ultimately up to the court to determine 
the just compensation award,64 and if the amount awarded is 
                                                                                                                                     
visited Nov. 5, 2013) [hereinafter CNN Foreclosure Map]; Samuel Weigley, Michael B. 
Sauter & Alexander E.M. Hess, The Worst Run Cities in America, 24/7 WALL ST., 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 19, 2013, 5:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/
19/worst-run-cities_n_2506894.html. Meanwhile, San Bernardino City, the central city 
of San Bernardino County, is listed as the number one worst managed counties in the 
country, and the city of Fontana, one of the two cities to outright join the County of San 
Bernardino in considering the MRP Proposal back in 2012, was also listed as one of the 
top 100 cities that has been hardest hit by foreclosures. Id.  
 58 See Laurie Nelson, Dechert LLP, California Authorities Consider Seizing 
Mortgages Secured by Residential Properties, CRUNCHED CREDIT (July 24, 2012), 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/california-authorities-consider-seizing-47365; see also 
Elizabeth L. McKeen et al., The Use of Eminent Domain to Write Down Mortgage Notes, 
O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.omm.com/the-use-of-eminent-
domain-to-write-down-mortgage-notes-09-05-2012/. 
 59 MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, supra note 15 at 12; O’Melveny Memo, 
supra note 24, at 13 (“The ‘quick take’ procedure . . . exposes the municipalities to 
substantial liabilities if MRP’s valuation assumptions are not adopted by courts.”). 
 60 See 2 AM. LAW. Zoning § 17:15 (5th ed. 2012). 
 61 Id. 
 62 O’Melveny Memo, supra note 24, at 15. 
 63 Id. at 6. 
 64 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 271 (2012). 
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more than the escrowed funds, it is unlikely that MRP’s 
investors, who would have already procured the mortgages, 
would be willing to pay any more for them.65 Thus, Mr. 
Dellinger reaches the same conclusion as Ms. Nelson, and 
contends that the potential additional payments the 
municipalities will have to make, “multiplied by thousands of 
loans, easily could result in hundreds of millions of dollars in 
liabilities.”66 Still, private-sector funding at least indicates 
that the required tax expenditure on the proposal will be 
much lower than if the governments were to attempt to fund 
these seizures on their own. 
The quick take aspect of the proposal is also highly 
disquieting to investors. As a result of the quick take procedure, 
the mortgages will have already been restructured and likely sold 
well before the courts determine what compensation is adequate 
to indemnify the target mortgagees.67 Thus, not only do current 
investors in these trusts stand to lose what they argue are some of 
their “best loans”—performing loans being paid off by 
creditworthy homeowners—at a substantial loss through the 
takings,68 they will also see their seized investments immediately 
resold to another pool of investors. 
Nevertheless, a growing number of cities, following in 
the wake of the City of Richmond’s approval of MRP’s proposal, 
are seriously analyzing the feasibility of such a plan.69 And 
 
 65 See O’Melveny Memo, supra note 24, at 2. See infra Part III addressing 
“just compensation.” 
 66 O’Melveny Memo, supra note 24, at 15. 
 67 Id. (“The option to abandon the taking if the price proves larger than 
anticipated does not exist under the MRP proposal because the notes will be extinguished 
and replaced with new, smaller notes, before the fair value litigation is resolved.”). 
 68 Sangree, supra note 46. 
 69 The City of El Monte is considered to be the next California city most likely to 
implement the proposal. Alejandro Lazo, El Monte Considers Eminent Domain Plan for 
Underwater Mortgages, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/
business/money/la-fi-mo-el-monte-eminent-domain-20130805,0,7256185.story. 
At least three other California municipalities—La Puente in Los Angeles County, 
and Orange Cove and San Joaquin in Fresno County—are also consulting with 
Mortgage Resolution Partners. Half a dozen other cities in the state have engaged in 
less formal discussions with the firm. North Las Vegas, Nev., has also approved a 
plan to move forward with the firm on a similar plan. 
Lazo, supra note 26. Furthermore, on September 11, 2013, in the face of litigation 
instigated by the banks and threats to stop lending to homeowners in the City, “[t]he 
City Council of Richmond, Calif., rejected a challenge to the city’s proposal to seize and 
write down troubled mortgages, instead voting 4 to 3 to invite other local governments 
to join its radical approach to slowing a wave of foreclosures.” E. Scott Reckard, 
Richmond Refuses to Kill Proposal to Seize Underwater Mortgages, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 
11, 2013, 12:13 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-richmond-
eminent-domain-mortgages-20130911,0,2179786.story. 
872 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:2 
though some elements of the plan may change, private-public 
partnership, like that proposed by MRP, is unlikely to be one of 
them. As MRP contends, the plan simply lies outside the 
budget of any municipality.70 The city of Richmond is certainly 
dependent on MRP’s funding to make implementation of the 
proposal feasible, as has already been made clear by the piling 
costs of litigation against the city’s mere approval of the 
program, which are all being covered by the private firm.71 
Thus, while interested cities may not specifically grant MRP 
the opportunity to partner with them, the governments 
contemplate a similar arrangement with a consultancy firm of 
their choice.72 
II. JUST THE MORTGAGE, NOT PLUS THE MORTGAGE? – AN 
UNINTENTIONAL LOOPHOLE IN TAKINGS LAW 
The debate over the constitutionality of the MRP proposal 
has evoked fervent opinions on both sides of the fence. Debaters 
address two main arguments: (1) whether mortgages are 
properties that can be seized through eminent domain, and (2) 
whether the proposal meets the standards set out in the Fifth 
Amendment.73 This section will survey both, drawing the 
distinction between those arguments that question the 
constitutionality of mortgage takings themselves and those that 
pertain to extraneous elements of the MRP proposal. Though 
introduced by MRP, the mortgage takings proposal neither 
requires interested jurisdictions to choose MRP as the 
 
 70 Hockett Memo, supra note 18, at 31. 
 71 See Doug Badger, Richmond Seizure Program: Dangerous Idea From a 
Dangerous City, A BRIEF CASE (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.dougsbriefcase.com/
blog/richmond-seizure-program-dangerous-idea-from-a-dangerous-city/ (“The city will 
rely on its banking partner, Mortgage Resolution Partners (MRP), a private investment 
fund, to raise money to buy the loans from bond trusts at the price established by the 
city.”); Staff Writer, Richmond Moving Forward With Eminent Domain Plan For 
Underwater Mortgages, CBS SAN FRANCISCO & BAY AREA NEWS SERV. (Sept. 11, 2013, 11:23 
PM), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2013/http://www.loansafe.org/experts-debate-legality-
of-plan-to-apply-eminent-domain-to-mortgagesdomain-plan-for-underwater-mortgages/ 
(“MRP executive chairman Steven Gluckstern noted . . . that the firm is covering legal 
costs associated with any litigation against the city related to the partnership and said 
a joint powers authority would provide further protection.”). 
 72 Andrew Edwards, Mortgage Resolution Partners Executive Defends Eminent 
Domain Proposal, SUN (July 26, 2012, 5:30 PM), http://www.sbsun.com/
ci_21168357#ixzz2ICdfDcQz; Ben Hallman, San Bernardino Eminent Domain Fight Closely 
Watched By Other Struggling Communities, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 1, 2012, 4:25 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/01/eminent-domain-mortgages_n_1836710.html. 
 73 The constitutionality of the proposal has also been contested under the 
contracts clause and commerce clause, neither of which have attracted significant attention 
nor detailed arguments, and which will not be addressed in this note. For those arguments, 
see generally Tambe et al., supra note 24; O’Melveny Memo, supra note 24. 
2014] REGULATING EMINENT DOMAIN FOR MORTGAGES 873 
consultancy firm with which to work nor ties jurisdictions 
implementing the plan to the specific requirements identified 
by MRP.74 This distinction is important because, if the MRP 
proposal is deemed unconstitutional, but mortgage takings 
themselves are not, the potential for future takings of mortgage 
securities or other similar properties remains. 
A. Are Mortgages Property Interests That Can Be Seized 
through Eminent Domain? 
Opponents of the MRP proposal have questioned the 
constitutionality of seizing mortgages on the basis of the 
unprecedented nature of the proposed takings. Arguably, the 
Supreme Court explicitly deemed mortgages a property interest 
for the purpose of government taking under the Fifth Amendment 
in the 1935 case of Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford.75 
In striking down a federal statute that forced mortgagees to 
forgive debt above the appraised value of foreclosed farm land, 
Justice Brandeis, writing for the court, commented: 
[If] the public interest requires, and permits, the taking of property 
of individual mortgagees in order to relieve the necessities of 
individual mortgagors, resort must be had to proceedings by eminent 
domain; so that, through taxation, the burden of the relief afforded 
in the public interest may be borne by the public.76 
The mortgage proposal relies on this statement for support.77 
However, a historical survey of mortgage takings law 
evinces that it is undeniably unprecedented to take mortgages 
 
 74 The City of Richmond is in fact currently working with MRP on potentially 
serving as their consultants for the proposal. However, the City is not using it as a first 
point of attack. Instead, it has made offers to purchase the mortgages on approximately 
650 homes, with the underlying threat of using eminent domain to seize the loans if the 
banks do not agree to the sales. Alejandro Lazo, Richmond Adopts Eminent Domain 
Mortgage Plan, L.A. TIMES (July 30, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/30/
business/la-fi-mo-richmond-eminent-domain-20130730. The San Bernardino County 
JPA, however, defined its purpose in considering the MRP proposal as broader than 
just determining whether to enter into a contractual relationship with MRP, indicating 
that the County was interested in the concept of the proposal and not necessarily the 
wholesale product MRP was presenting. See Nelson, supra note 58 (quoting Gregory 
Devereaux, CEO of San Bernardino County and chairperson of the JPA, explaining 
that “the JPA was formed to explore ideas and programs to address the housing crisis 
openly and with the community as a whole” (internal quotations omitted), and stating 
that “there are currently no proposals or programs before this body”). 
 75 295 U.S. 555, 602 (1935); see also 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 240, 
supra note 16 (citing Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935), 
for the proposition that “[a] mortgagee’s lien is a property interest within the meaning 
of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 76 Radford, 295 U.S. at 602. 
 77 See Reiss, supra note 38, at 3. 
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without also a concomitant taking of the attached real 
property.78 In the past, mortgage takings were only effected to 
relieve lenders (or mortgagees) in circumstances where the 
underlying securities for their mortgages—the mortgaged 
properties—had been seized.79 In effect, the takings granted the 
mortgagees the right to the portion of the just compensation 
payment paid to the prior property owners that was equivalent 
to the remaining mortgage debt.80 This was not a perfect form 
of relief as mortgagees were not guaranteed full payment of the 
debt owed. Mortgagees could not demand further compensation 
above that made to individual property owners,81 and 
valuations to determine just compensation were not made 
based on the value of the mortgages but rather on the market 
value of the properties.82 Indeed, for those who argue that the 
value of a mortgage incorporates more than the value of the 
underlying security, the just compensation valuation for 
separate mortgage takings will be different from the valuation 
of homes.83 Thus, many argue that the power of eminent 
domain has, in fact, never been used to seize mortgages.84 
Furthermore, it is indeterminable whether the court 
had such a purpose in mind when it made its statement in 
Louisville Joint Stock.85 Up to now, a majority of courts has 
arguably read the Louisville Joint Stock dicta as, at the very 
least, indicating that “a mortgagee’s lien is a property interest 
[in the real estate to which it is attached] within the meaning 
of the Fifth Amendment.”86 This is the only reading that 
 
 78 See generally 154 A.L.R. 1110, supra note 16 (providing a table of sample cases, 
the laws and rules involving the mortgage takings in all federal circuits and state courts). 
 79 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain, supra note 16, at § 240. 
 80 Id. (“When the mortgaged property is taken by eminent domain or 
damaged to such an extent that the security of the mortgage is impaired, the 
mortgagee’s rights against the land follow the award, so the mortgagee may have the 
mortgage debt satisfied out of the award in advance of other creditors of the 
mortgagor.”). 
 81 Id. 
 82 17B CARMODY-WAIT 2D § 108:96 (2012) (“A preexisting mortgage lien on 
the appropriated property is extinguished as of the date the condemnor takes title, and, 
if the mortgage is then enforceable, there is substituted in its place an equitable lien 
against the eminent domain award to the extent of the mortgagee’s claim.”). 
 83 See O’Melveny Memo, supra note 24. 
 84 See Andrew Edwards, California’s Lieutenant Governor Steps into Mortgage 
Debate, SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SUN (July 28, 2012), http://www.sbsun.com/
breakingnews/ci_21177556/californias-lieutenant-governor-steps-into-mortgage-debate 
(“People on both sides of the issue say using eminent domain to buy mortgage loans is 
unprecedented.”); O’Melveny Memo, supra note 24, at 1. See infra Part II for further 
discussion on the constitutionality of mortgage takings. 
 85 29 U.S. at 602. 
 86 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 240, supra note 16. 
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explains the majority’s subsequent reasoning that a mortgagee 
should “have the mortgage debt satisfied out of the [just 
compensation] award [for the seized home] in advance of other 
creditors of the mortgagor.”87 The majority view does not 
encompass a separate valuation of the mortgage but, rather, 
only provides relief for the mortgagee up to the determined just 
compensation payment for the home that has been subject to 
condemnation or governmental foreclosure. 
Yet, there is some indication that a minority of 
jurisdictions has made the distinction between the mortgage 
and the property securing it, viewing them as separate 
interests in the context of Fifth Amendment takings law. As 
American Jurisprudence summarizes: 
In states following the lien theory of mortgages and deeds of trust, 
under which the mortgagor or trustee has a lien against the property 
but not legal title to it, the mortgagee or trustee does not have an 
“ownership” interest in the real property taken and, thus, is not 
normally constitutionally entitled to compensation.88 
The article goes on to note, however, that, while “[o]nly 
those with ownership interests are generally entitled to 
compensation when the property is condemned,” these 
jurisdictions nevertheless provide the mortgagees with relief 
under theories of the mortgagee’s “contract right distinct from 
title.”89 This treatment, in spite of state doctrine that the 
attaching mortgage does not create a contractual property right 
to underlying land, seems to indicate that these states recognize 
that the mortgage may, on its own, be seized. Thus, in light of 
this minority treatment, bolstered by the Supreme Court’s open-
ended statement in Louisville, and the precedential use of 
eminent domain to take other intangible forms of property,90 
mortgages are likely properties that may be subject to seizure 
under eminent domain. 
B. Does a Mortgage Seizure Proposal Meet Fifth 
Amendment Standards of Constitutionality? 
While the requirements of the Fifth Amendment are 
simply stated in its text—“nor shall private property be taken 
 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Matthew S. Bethards, Condemning a Patent: Taking Intellectual Property 
by Eminent Domain, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 81, 84 (2004). 
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for public use, without just compensation”91—Supreme Court 
interpretations of the constitutional boundaries of the public 
use requirement have grown increasingly less restrictive, and 
it is consequently more difficult to prove a breach.92 In 
reviewing a purported public use, the Court has employed a 
general rule of deference to the government under which the 
Court requires little more than proof that the motive behind 
the public purpose is legitimate: 
Our review of whether a taking is for “public use” is necessarily 
deferential: “When the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its 
means are not irrational, . . . empirical debates over the wisdom of 
takings . . . are not to be carried out in the federal courts.”93 
The Court has otherwise entrusted the determination of 
the kinds of projects that will satisfy the public use 
requirement solely to the government, excusing itself from 
exercising judgment on the basis of policy.94 
Moreover, if mortgages are property interests that can be 
reached by eminent domain, the constitutionality of mortgage 
takings, and the MRP proposal, under the Fifth Amendment is 
determined solely based on whether the seizure was for a public 
use.95 The just compensation prong of the Fifth Amendment test 
only serves to indicate what will adequately compensate the 
property owner for their loss, or, as it is generally otherwise seen, 
what will spread the burden of providing a public benefit amongst 
the public.96 Thus, while the determination of just compensation 
has economic implications for both the prior property owner and 
the government, it could only affect the constitutionality of the 
takings if the governments exercising eminent domain refused to 
pay the mortgagees what the court determined to be fair market 
value of the seized mortgage liens.97 
 
 91 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
 92 See generally Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New 
London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 491 (2006). 
 93 Fideicomiso De La Tierra Del Caño Martin Peña v. Fortuno, 604 F.3d 7, 18 
(1st Cir. 2010) (citing Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1984)), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011). 
 94 Oswald, supra note 11, at 261-62. 
 95 See Reiss, supra note 38, at 3 (arguing that, while what the courts 
determine to be just compensation will be of “great import [to] investors, it is not 
relevant for purposes of evaluating the constitutionality of the use of eminent domain 
in this context”). 
 96 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 6 (2012). 
 97 The economic implications of the just compensation determinations should 
play a role in the local governments’ analyses as to whether to go forward with this 
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The most recent evolution of the public use doctrine is 
embodied in the highly provocative Supreme Court ruling in Kelo 
v. City of New London,98 in which the Court took “an expansive 
[and highly controversial] view of the ‘public [use]’ requirement.”99 
In Kelo, “property owners sued the City of New London and 
the New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a nonprofit 
development corporation established by the city, to enjoin use of 
the eminent domain power in furtherance of a comprehensive 
economic development plan.”100 Under the plan, the seized land 
would be leased to “various private developers, who would then 
develop the parcels in accordance with the plan.”101 This 
included the building of “a waterfront hotel and conference 
center, marinas, a public walkway along the river, residences, a 
Coast Guard museum, space for high technology research and 
development office space, additional office and retail space, and 
parking.”102 The plan was “projected to create in excess of 1,000 
jobs, to increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an 
economically distressed city, including its downtown and 
waterfront areas.”103 
Many saw the Kelo proposal as nothing more than a 
transfer of property rights from one set of private citizens to 
another. The Kelo property owner petitioners argued that the 
development did not constitute a public use under the Fifth 
Amendment: 
The petitioners contended that a “public benefit” is not equivalent to 
a “public use,” asserting, “[I]f nothing more is required to constitute 
a public use than listing expected tax revenue and job growth that 
might result from private development, then there is scarcely any 
private use or business for which the power of eminent domain could 
not be used.”104 
The court nevertheless ruled in favor of the city. 
Kelo has been read to establish that even as broad a 
purpose as “economic development” is sufficient to satisfy the 
                                                                                                                                     
proposal. As a result, the just compensation issue will not be addressed in this section 
but in Part III infra, in discussing the potential problems created by the proposal. 
 98 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 99 See Reiss, supra note 38, at 3 (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 
469 (2005)). 
 100 Cohen, supra note 92,  at 516. 
 101 Id. at 517. 
 102 Id. at 516-17. 
 103 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472. 
 104 Cohen, supra note 92, at 518 (citing Brief of Petitioners at 10, Kelo v. City of 
New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108)). 
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Fifth Amendment.105 However, this is a narrow reading of the 
case’s holding. While the Kelo decision did permit a taking 
promulgated on the basis of general economic development for the 
surrounding area, the court did not focus on the specific question 
of whether “economic development itself constituted a public use 
under the Fifth Amendment.”106 The Kelo holding instead 
seemed to broaden the scope of the definition of “public use” to 
encompass cases where the use of seized property, though 
thought to be generally beneficial for the public, was not 
necessarily open to all members of the public.107 However, even 
prior to Kelo, the Supreme Court had made some capacious 
assertions as to what would satisfy the public use requirement 
of the Fifth Amendment. Most significantly, the Court had 
reinterpreted the phrase “public use” to require nothing more 
than a “public purpose.”108 
Kelo’s most significant doctrinal addition is its narrowing 
of the longstanding restriction placed on takings for private use to 
merely prohibiting takings for “strictly,” or only, private use.109 
Kelo made it clear that takings that result in the reaping of 
private benefits do not per se fail under the public use test.110 
Even under Kelo, the government may not simply assert a public 
purpose; the court has indicated that it will look to ensure that 
the public use is “paramount,” and the bestowment of a private 
interest is merely incidental.111 Nevertheless, as was the case in 
Kelo, a taking which essentially encompasses a transfer from one 
private party to another may still be constitutionally permissible 
if there is an “underlying”112 or “justifying public purpose.”113 
 
 105 Eric Rutkow, Comment, Kelo v. City of New London, 30 HARV. ENVT’L. L. 
REV. 261, 261 (2006), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/elr/
vol30_1/rutkow.pdf. 
 106 Id. at 263 (internal quotations omitted). In Kelo,  
the Court held by a vote of 5 to 4 that the Takings Clause allowed 
Connecticut and the City of New London to seize a private home and transfer 
it to private developers. The purpose of this transfer was to establish a 
private research facility whose development might stimulate the depressed 
local economy.  
Tambe et al., supra note 24. 
 107 See Cohen, supra note 92, at 518-19. 
 108 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984). 
 109 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 27 (2012) (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 
545 U.S. 469 (2005); Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)). 
 110 See Cohen, supra note 92, at 518-19. 
 111 Rutkow, supra note 105, at 263. 
 112 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 27, supra note 109 (citing Key Properties 
Group, LLC v. City of Milford, 995 A.2d 147, 152 (Del. 2010)). 
 113 Fideicomiso De La Tierra Del Caño Martin Peña v. Fortuno, 604 F.3d 7, 17 
(1st Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011). 
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Thus, under these rules, the question presented by the 
mortgage seizure proposal is whether the government has (1) a 
bona fide public purpose that justifies the transfer of the 
mortgages from the former private owners to new private 
investors, which (2) is not merely an incidental benefit to a 
more primary private benefit afforded to the private investors 
who will purchase the refinanced mortgages. 
Though the proposal has been shelved in San Bernardino 
and some of its constituent local governments (ostensibly due to 
lack of public support, but also likely in response to industry and 
FHFA pressures),114 the San Bernardino County Board of 
Supervisors had in fact gone so far as to form a Joint Exercise of 
Powers Authority (JPA), including the county and the cities of 
Fontana and Ontario,115 “to devise a Homeowners Protection 
Plan”116 to address the MRP proposal.117 The participating 
constituencies laid out a comprehensive public purpose for the 
proposed takings in the Recitals to the Joint Exercise of Powers 
Agreement Homeownership Protection Program that they 
signed last year: 
For the past four years, the communities within the Parties’ jurisdiction 
have been adversely affected by an unprecedented economic downturn. 
Unemployment has reached record high levels, revenue to local 
governments throughout California has dropped to historic lows, and 
[there has been] a drop in household income particularly for working 
families . . . . Concomitantly, home values in the Parties’ jurisdictions 
have plummeted, resulting in “underwater loans” or “negative 
equity” . . . and accordingly increasing the likelihood of further 
foreclosures, inhibiting the ability to refinance, and dampening 
consumer confidence and economic activity. 
The Parties wish to enter into a joint powers agreement that will 
establish a joint powers authority (“Authority”) to assist in preserving 
home ownership and occupancy for homeowners with negative equity 
within the Parties’ jurisdictions, avoid the negative impacts of 
underwater loans and further foreclosures, and enhance the economic 
vitality and the health of their communities (the . . . “Program”). The 
 
 114 Alejandro Lazo, San Bernardino County Abandons Eminent Domain 
Mortgage Plan, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/24/
business/la-fi-mo-eminent-domain-20130124. 
 115 See Ghori, supra note 32, at 2. 
 116 Eminent Domain Resource Center, The County of San Bernardino, 
California is Considering a New Plan to Use “Eminent Domain” As a Solution to Help 
Underwater Borrowers and Address the Country’s Housing Crisis, SIFMA, 
www.sifma.org/issues/capital-markets/securitization/eminent-domain/overview/. For a 
copy of the draft agreement, see Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement: Homeownership 
Protection Program [hereinafter JPA Agreement], available at http://online.wsj.com/
public/resources/documents/EMINENT-jpa-agreement.pdf (last visited Sept.12, 2103). 
 117 See Ghori, supra note 32. 
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Program may include the Authority’s acquisition of underwater 
residential mortgage loans by voluntary purchase or eminent domain 
and the restructuring of these loans to allow homeowners to continue to 
own and occupy their homes.118 
These paragraphs clearly explicate the crisis faced by 
the participating areas, the purpose of the proposed mortgage 
takings, and how they will address the needs of the public. 
Significantly, they do not include any reference to sale of the 
loans to private entities, evidencing the bona fide nature of the 
purported public purpose. 
Furthermore, even if the final proposal involves funding 
and sale to private investors, as the Richmond proposal does 
and as is allowed under current takings doctrine, the court may 
nonetheless find that the purported public purpose is bona fide. 
The concern for addressing the mortgage crisis appears to be 
paramount to any profit that may be gained as a result of the 
program. Like many of the cities in San Bernardino County, 
the city of Richmond is similarly ridden with underwater 
homes119 and has expressed frustration with the inability to 
help residents out of the crisis.120 The plethora of support for 
the program from disinterested parties also bolsters the 
honesty of the belief that the use of eminent domain in this 
circumstance will help to alleviate the foreclosure crisis.121 
The potential involvement of MRP and its investors 
poses some countervailing challenges to a finding of a bona fide 
public purpose. As opponents have pointed out, the fact that 
the MRP investors both fund the program and immediately 
receive returns as a result of the program appears devious. 
Open accusations have been cast against MRP that it “designed 
[the program] for the express purpose of creating profits for 
 
 118 JPA Agreement, supra note 116, at 1. 
 119 Alejandro Lazo, supra note 74. 
 120 One commentator noted that the Chairman of the San Bernardino JPA did 
not even seem “married to the eminent domain plan of attack,” but rather “appeared to 
be pleading that . . . solutions to the housing mess in San Bernardino County be 
presented to the JPA.” Nelson, supra note 58. Similarly, Mayor of Richmond, Gayle 
McLaughlin, in relation to the City of Richmond’s approval of the eminent domain 
proposal, commented that “Richmond and its residents have been badly harmed by this 
housing crisis,” “[t]he banks have been unwilling or unable to fix this situation, [and] 
so the city is stepping in to provide a fix.” Carolyn Said, Richmond to Pursue Eminent 
Domain on Mortgages, SFGATE (Sept. 11, 2013, 10:29 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/
bayarea/article/Richmond-to-pursue-eminent-domain-on-mortgages-4807122.php 
(quoting Mayor Gayle McLaughlin of Richmond, Ca.). 
 121 See, e.g., David Reiss, Eminently Reasonable, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 24, 2012) (“The 
financial industry is alarmed by this proposal, claiming that the sky will fall if it is 
implemented. But this proposal is constitutional, beneficial and administratively feasible. 
Local governments should give it a try as they seek to stabilize their communities.”). 
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[its] investors [and itself], and not primarily for a public 
purpose.”122 The problem with this argument is that MRP, as a 
private entity, is allowed to have a private motive, which does 
not prevent the municipalities from partnering with the 
company for the public good.123 Under Kelo, the question 
becomes whether the private gain outweighs the public benefit 
and, given the Court’s deference to the government in 
determining the extent of the public benefit, it is unlikely that 
MRP’s economic benefit from the proposal will counter the 
weight of the government’s arguments for the substantial 
public benefit they believe the proposal will create. 
The most constitutionally disadvantageous aspect of the 
MRP proposal, however, is the focus on and limitation to non-
defaulted underwater mortgages. Despite MRP CEO Steven 
Gluckstern’s explanation that “those loans have the best chance of 
being refinanced and helping the plan succeed,”124 a more cynical 
journalist has proffered that “the attempt to ‘pluck low-hanging 
fruit’ at a steep discount might not fly with the courts.”125 In other 
words, the proposal’s target of only non-defaulted loans may more 
strongly indicate that the true purpose of the plan is to serve 
private interests. Cutting against these arguments is MRP’s 
indication that it will consider extending its program to include 
defaulted mortgages.126 However, it is reported that the City of 
Richmond has only made offers on performing loans, as originally 
contemplated, a fact that may work significantly to the city’s 
detriment in litigation.127 
 
 122 Tambe et al., supra note 24. 
 123 MRP is not the body authorized to use nor the body using eminent domain 
to effect the takings. Thus, its private aspirations for the proposal are irrelevant, 
provided that the cities’ primary purpose is not to satisfy MRP’s private goals, but 
rather to benefit the public. See 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 27 (2012). However, in 
the case of Richmond, it is further alleged that the city is to receive a partnership cut of 
the MRP profits from the resale of the loans, a fact that plaintiffs Wells Fargo and 
Deusche Bank argue point to an unconstitutional private interest of the City itself in 
implementing the proposal. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 9, Wells 
Fargo Bank, Nat’l Assoc. v. City of Richmond, 13 CV 3663, 2013 WL 4016499 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 7, 2013). 
 124 Sangree, supra note 46. 
 125 Id. (quoting Gideon Kanner, a professor emeritus at Loyola Law School in 
Los Angeles who specializes in eminent domain law). 
 126 Ghori, supra note 32. 
 127 See David Levine, The Housing Crisis in Richmond, California and the Debate 
Over Eminent Domain, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Sept. 2, 2013), http://www.wsws.org/
en/articles/2013/09/17/cali-s17.html (“MRP has selected 624 residences for the program—
less than 15 percent of the city’s residences with underwater mortgages. Even more telling 
are the criteria by which the residences were selected. Over 70 percent of those selected 
are current on their payments, and those that are not current have, for the most part, 
missed only one or two payments.”). 
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Some opponents have also asserted that the Kelo holding 
is limited to its context, arguing that, under Kelo, governments 
may only use their eminent domain power to transfer seized 
property to private parties in cases in which the taking is part of a 
broader, comprehensive plan for economic development.128 Thus, 
they argue that the transfers of the property to a private party 
such as MRP render the plan unconstitutional because the MRP 
proposal seems to contemplate that the takings will encompass 
the sum total of the Homeownership Protection Program, as 
opposed to being a part of a comprehensive plan.129 But there is no 
indication that the Kelo court meant to limit the allowance to 
such cases. Furthermore, there is no implication, either from the 
Recitals to the JPA, quoted above, or the City of Richmond, that 
the mortgage takings will be the summation of the cities’ plans 
to address the crisis facing targeted communities.130 
Therefore, in comparing the arguments, in light of 
current political views on the proposal (particularly in 
California) and judicial liberalness in the application of current 
takings law, the proposal will likely be found constitutional. 
III. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS CREATED BY APPROVAL AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MORTGAGE TAKINGS 
PROPOSAL 
As Part II illustrates, the courts will categorically ignore 
all issues of policy in determining the constitutionality of the 
mortgage seizure proposal. Thus, though a proposal to use the 
power of eminent domain could be held constitutional, it may still 
not be advisable as a matter of policy. The heated debate over the 
wisdom of implementing a mortgage seizure proposal was well 
documented in the months following the public exposure of the 
MRP proposal, and of San Bernardino County’s interest in the 
plan.131 This debate has continued with the proposal’s resurgence 
in the City of Richmond.132 Opponents ardently maintain that the 
use of eminent domain to take mortgages “would hurt the very 
people [it] is supposed to help,”133 and unnecessarily forces losses 
on investors across a national platform.134 Proponents, on the 
 
 128 Tambe et al., supra note 24. 
 129 Id. 
 130 For example, the Recitals to the Joint Powers Agreement specifically states 
that “the program may include” mortgage takings. JPA Agreement, supra note 116, at 1. 
 131 Goldstein & Ablan, supra note 25. 
 132 See Lazo, supra note 80. 
 133 John, supra note 3. 
 134 Yoon, supra note 25. 
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other hand, argue that the program would benefit “cities, 
investors, and borrowers alike.”135 The common feature among 
both sets of debaters, however, is the complexity of the 
arguments made, illustrating the greater sophistication of both 
mortgages as a form of property and the considerations that 
should be taken into account in determining whether to move 
forward with such a plan. This section aims to highlight some 
of the key concerns with respect to the proposal. 
The main policy argument in favor of the mortgage 
proposal is that it facilitates principal reduction. MRP’s chief legal 
consultant, and Cornell Law School professor, Robert Hockett 
argues that “[d]ebt must be trimmed back” to right the collapsing 
mortgage market.136 Evidently supported by his colleagues at 
MRP, who individually have impressive backgrounds in the field 
of finance,137 he has also gained the support of leading economists 
such as Robert Shiller from Yale University and L. Randall Wray, 
a professor of economics at the University of Missouri-Kansas 
City, who have remarked that homeowner “debt reduction is 
necessary to reignite the economy,” and “[e]minent domain may 
be the only way local governments can try to resolve the crisis.”138 
The excitement surrounding this unusual approach to 
achieving debt reduction stems from an ongoing frustration with 
the challenges faced in achieving principal reduction on 
securitized mortgages. Hockett argues that the main obstacle in 
the path toward principal reduction is not the reluctance of 
primary mortgagees (such as the banks) to consider it, but rather 
“the collective action challenges” posed by the nature of the 
mortgage-backed securities market.139 Because the securities are 
owned by numerous and dispersed investors, it is difficult and 
arguably often impossible to get all of the investors to agree to a 
course of action that, on the face of it, reduces the value of their 
investments.140 Furthermore, without “combined orchestration,” 
each investor will wait to see how other investors revalue the 
 
 135 Robert Hockett, PREPARED REMARKS FOR THE FINANCIAL SERVICES PANEL 
SERIES, THE HONORABLE MAXINE WATERS (CA-35) PRESENTING THE HOUSING CRISIS 
AND POLICY SOLUTIONS: SHOULD EMINENT DOMAIN BE USED TO SAVE UNDERWATER 
HOMEOWNERS? 10 (2012), available at http://mortgageresolution.com/sites/default/files/
attachments/testimony_of_robert_hockett_11_september_2012.pdf. 
 136 Id. 
 137 For bios of the MRP partners, see Partners, MORTGAGE RESOLUTION 
PARTNERS, http://mortgageresolutionpartners.com/partners (last visited Jan. 16, 2013). 
 138 Goldstein & Ablan, supra note 25. 
 139 Hockett Memo, supra note 18, at 15-17. 
 140 Id. at 28. 
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mortgages, thus resulting in inaction by all.141 Correspondingly, 
Hockett argues that: 
Eminent domain clears title to the loan, to the security interest, and to the 
just compensation proceeds of the action. In one consolidated action, the 
local government clears up all of these paperwork problems and makes 
literally everyone better off—just as it more broadly makes communities, 
investors and homeowners all better off by paying fair value for the loans, 
reducing principal, and keeping Americans in their homes.142 
Though principal reduction, the underlying goal of the 
proposal, has long been discussed as one of the main ways in 
which the mortgage crisis should be addressed,143 as Professor 
Hockett himself points out, it is not a perfect solution; a major 
issue with “principal forgiveness is that it leaves the lender or 
guarantor with one-sided, continued default risk.”144 That is, 
“[i]f the property goes up in value the homeowner benefits, but 
if the property goes down in value then the homeowner might 
still default, and the lender or guarantor bears the cost.”145 
Professor Hockett claims that “[e]minent domain eliminates 
this one-sided risk by paying the lender fair value for the 
loan.”146 Thus, he argues, eminent domain will also be in the 
interest of the mortgagees. 
However, while eminent domain indeed removes default-
risk from the hands of the original mortgagees, it only does so by 
placing the risk in the hands of new mortgagees—at first, the 
hands of the state and, in the case of the MRP proposal, the hands 
of a new set of private investors—on nonnegotiable terms that the 
original mortgagees may not consider favorable. In other words, 
the use of eminent domain strips mortgagees of a right that 
ordinary principal reduction does not—the right to choose which 
mortgages to assume this risk on, which mortgages to sell, and the 
value at which the mortgages should be sold. This in turn produces 
incidental negative consequences that will be discussed below. 
 
 141 Id. at 17. Professor Hockett also discusses other perverse results of the 
second lien market—created by homeowners that take out additional mortgages on 
their home—that have proven disadvantageous to the process of principal reduction. 
Id. at 20-24. 
 142 Hockett, supra note 135, at 10. 
 143 Hudson Sangree, Lenders Less Leery of Reducing Homeowners’ Principal, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, May 13, 2012, at 1A, available at http://www.tmsspecialtyproducts.com/
article/Lenders-less-leery-of-reducing/201205170803MCT_____NEWSSERV_BC-REAL-
PRINCIPAL-SA_446. 
 144 Hockett, supra note 135, at 9. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
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The right to choose is a central tenet of the industry 
pushback on the mortgage seizure proposal. Professor Hockett’s 
reasoning that eminent domain will “be in the interest of the 
mortgagees” is only sufficient if (1) the loans seized are likely to 
default, and (2) what a court determines to be fair value (or just 
compensation) for the loans align with or even surpass the value 
to the investors of holding the loan. The former point is 
undermined by the specific loans the MRP program is currently 
targeting—underwater loans that are least likely to be defaulted. 
As Walter Dellinger, of O’Melveny and Myers, argued, “there is no 
basis for assuming [a performing] loan will default . . . . Indeed, 
the data show that a clear majority of loans that have been 
performing for years will not default.”147 In fact, 2012 data 
indicated that “[t]he majority of underwater homeowners 
continue to make regular payments on their mortgage, with only 
10.1 percent of the 31.4 percent nationwide being delinquent.”148 
Additionally, how close the court’s valuation will be to 
an acceptable just compensation payment in the eyes of the 
mortgagees is contingent on the means the court employs to 
value the mortgages. It is uncertain whether the courts will look 
more to (1) the underlying security—the home—or (2) to other 
factors—such as the performance of or the interest rate on the 
loan—in determining the value of the mortgages.149 It is also 
unclear whether the court will (1) consider the value of the 
individual mortgage or (2) the value of the loss to the mortgage 
pool from which the mortgage was taken to determine its value.150 
The latter in both sets of options would likely closer approximate 
the mortgagees’ valuation of the mortgage, and the former, the 
just compensation MRP hopes the courts will award. 
But why should we care about investors’ satisfaction 
coming out of these transactions, particularly if the terms of 
the takings in fact turn out to be more favorable to them than 
expected, and furthermore, if the result is to lift communities 
out of severe financial distress? Opponents contend that we 
care because of the long-term effects on the market of 
 
 147 O’Melveny Memo, supra note 24, at 6-7. 
 148 Stan Humphries, Despite Home Value Gains, Underwater Homeowners Owe 
$1.2 Trillion More Than Homes’ Worth, ZILLOW REAL ESTATE RESEARCH (May 24, 2012), 
http://www.zillow.com/blog/research/2012/05/24/despite-home-value-gains-underwater-
homeowners-owe-1-2-trillion-more-than-homes-worth/. 
 149 “The value of a mortgage to the lender or owner of the loan depends largely 
on its performance (i.e., payment history) and interest rates, rather than on the appraised 
value of the real property being mortgaged.” O’Melveny Memo, supra note 24, at 6. 
 150 Andrew M. Grossman, San Bernardino Mortgage Seizure Plan Raises 
Serious Constitutional Concerns, HERITAGE FOUND. ISSUE BRIEF, (July 16, 2012). 
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introducing the threat of the use of eminent domain. For 
example, David Sterns, President of the Mortgage Banker’s 
Association, among others, argues that implementation of the 
proposal will signal to current and future investors that their 
investments are under threat of seizure by eminent domain.151 
This threat is predicated on a perceived unpredictability as to 
when the power of eminent domain will be exercised.152 This 
concern is not entirely unfounded; the plan does not conceive a 
time frame during which these takings will occur. While one 
could make assumptions that the power will only be exercised 
for the duration of the crisis, that is an ambiguous time block 
and supposes that investors will trust the government to use 
the power only during this isolated crisis and not every time 
the housing market takes a dip. 
The perceived risk is inflated by the potential that, if 
investors’ performing mortgages are seized, investors may not 
receive the value of the loans to them. Because underwater 
mortgages may not default, mortgagees also likely attach a 
subjective value to the risk of holding onto these loans—based 
on weighing the risk of default against the potential that these 
underwater mortgages will be paid off, and that they will realize 
the full face value of the lien.153 However, in determining just 
compensation, the court does not incorporate the subjective 
valuation of the mortgagees, but rather the objective current fair 
market value of the asset, “what a willing buyer would pay in 
cash to a willing seller at the time of the taking.”154 
Of course, the obvious pushback is that, realistically, 
crises of this nature are highly infrequent, though, given the 
courts’ deference to agency determination of public use, it is 
imaginable that there is some room for abuse of discretion in 
determining what constitutes a sufficient downturn in the 
market to warrant the use of eminent domain.155 Furthermore, 
 
 151 Letter from David H. Stevens, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Mortgage 
Bankers Assoc. to Alfred Pollard, Gen. Counsel, Federal Housing & Fin. Agency (Sept. 
7, 2012) [hereinafter MBA Letter], available at http://www.mba.org/files/
MBAEDLettertoFHFA.pdf. 
 152 John, supra note 3 (“By adding a new level of uncertainty about whether 
the mortgages will be repaid according to the original contract, future investors would 
see all mortgage-backed securities as riskier than before.”). 
 153 See Nelson, supra note 58. 
 154 Grossman, supra note 150 (citing U.S. v. 564.54 Acres of Land, More or 
Less, Situated in Monroe and Pike, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979)). 
 155 Kevin McCoy, 2008 Financial Crisis: Could It Happen Again?, USA TODAY 
(Sept. 9. 2013, 12:20 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/09/
08/legacy-2008-financial-crisis-lehman/2723733/ (While predicting that a crisis as 
major as the 2008 implosion was “far less likely, [David] Hirschmann[,] president and 
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investors’ memories tend to be short, rendering the likely long-
term impact of the occasional use of eminent domain to be 
small if not negligible.156 
Nevertheless, in the securities market, on which so 
much of the housing market has come to depend,157 how the 
investors “feel” about their prospects of realizing a return on 
investments plays an exceptionally large role in the survival of 
the current mortgage system. The added risk of not only having 
their investments seized, but having to surrender those 
investments at an exceptional loss, may prove either (1) too large 
for investors, or (2) too expensive for prospective mortgagees to 
bear. As one opponent argued: 
The fundamental flaw underlying the . . . proposal is the mistaken 
assumption that violating the property rights of unpopular parties—
those holding mortgage-backed securities—can somehow strengthen the 
real estate market without causing massive collateral damage. But the 
reality is that weakening property rights ultimately increases 
uncertainty, undermines markets, and often fails to accomplish the 
government’s goals.158 
This response is a bit of an overstatement, but it points to some 
realistic potential market reactions, particularly if the use of 
eminent domain becomes a frequent or expected occurrence in 
certain communities. 
Many, from the FHFA to a large number of the most 
experienced institutional financial players, have expounded on 
some of the ways in which this risk may undermine the market 
and hurt homeowners.159 According to the Mortgage Bankers 
Association, “[i]n essence, the Government entity is writing itself 
a ‘call option’ on the mortgage, which they can then exercise 
when home values decline to their lowest points, seizing the 
mortgage and locking the lender and servicer into an assured 
loss.”160 As the Association noted, to date, this risk has not been 
included in the pricing of mortgages, but in areas where the 
power to seize mortgages is realized, and worse so utilized, 
“those who invest in mortgages [may either] refuse to buy loans 
originated in these communities” (and lenders would resultantly 
                                                                                                                                     
CEO of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness 
warn[s], ‘That doesn’t mean there won’t be failures.’”). 
 156 See, e.g., Short Memories, Deep Pockets: Investors Desperate for High Yields 
Are Piling into High-Risk Bonds. Here we go again, ECONOMIST (June 10, 2003), 
http://www.economist.com/node/1840188. 
 157 See generally ASF Letter, supra note 34. 
 158 Grossman, supra note 150. 
 159 E.g., ABA Letter, supra note 37. 
 160 MBA Letter, supra note 151. 
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refuse to lend for home purchases in these areas),161 or “demand 
that the underlying mortgages be written with even tighter 
credit standards and higher down payments.”162 
Thus, as has been argued, the use of eminent domain in 
this context may “have a chilling effect on the extension of credit 
to . . . [prospective] homeowners and on investors.”163 As one 
commentator pointed out, “[t]he 43.4 percent of San Bernardino 
County homeowners whose mortgages are underwater would 
find that they had fewer opportunities to sell their homes as 
mortgage lenders flee their communities.”164 It is also suggested 
that “restricting the flow of credit to homebuyers” would in fact 
have the consequential effect of “suppress[ing] housing 
values,”165 the very issue that created the foreclosure crisis to 
begin with.166 Furthermore, from a social policy perspective, it is 
the poorer that would be most likely affected. “Potential 
homebuyers with lower credit ratings or lower incomes would 
find either that they cannot obtain a mortgage or that it would 
cost them more than it would have otherwise.”167 
In response to these threats to investors and, it is argued, 
homeowners, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association168 “proposed prohibiting loans originated in areas 
using eminent domain from a key part of the five trillion dollar 
mortgage-backed securities market that is a backbone for U.S. 
housing finance.”169 The FHFA has specifically reasserted these 
threats in response to the Richmond proposal,170 while California 
 
 161 Id. 
 162 John, supra note 3. 
 163 FHFA 2012 Notice, supra note 22. 
 164 John, supra note 3. 
 165 MBA Letter, supra note 151. 
 166 Kristopher Gerardi et al., Decomposing the Foreclosure Crisis: House Price 
Depreciation versus Bad Underwriting (Abstract), FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA 
WORKING PAPER (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/
wp0925.pdf (“We . . . conclude that the foreclosure crisis was primarily driven by the 
severe decline in housing prices that began in the latter part of 2005 . . . .”). 
 167 John, supra note 3. 
 168 As the organization describes itself on its website, “SIFMA brings together 
the shared interests of hundreds of securities firms, banks and asset managers. These 
companies are engaged in communities across the country to raise capital for businesses, 
promote job creation and lead economic growth.” About, SIFMA.ORG, http://www.sifma.org/
about/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2013). 
 169 Yoon, supra note 25. 
 170 See FHFA Statement, supra note 45 (“In response to an eminent domain 
action to restructure mortgage loans, FHFA may take any of the following steps: 
initiate legal challenges to any local or state action that sanctions the use of eminent 
domain to restructure mortgage loan contracts that affect FHFA’s regulated entities; 
act by order or by regulation to direct the regulated entities to limit, restrict or cease 
business activities within the jurisdiction of any state or local authority employing 
eminent domain to restructure mortgage loan contracts; or take such other actions as 
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Congressional Representative John Campbell has introduced a bill 
that “would prohibit Fannie, Freddie, FHA and the Department of 
Veterans Affairs from insuring or guaranteeing newly originated 
single-family loans in counties that use eminent domain.”171 
But how is the inclusion of the additional risk of potential 
seizure by eminent domain any different from some of the other 
threats real estate and mortgage-backed securities investors have 
stomached, without any appreciable freezing on the market? 
Cramdown, under the Bankruptcy Code, and foreclosure, for 
example, are like eminent domain in the sense that the lenders 
will only get paid the fair market value of the seized properties, or 
even less under foreclosure.172 One difference, however, is that the 
value of a mortgage is arguably not the same as that of the 
underlying property.173 Valuations for mortgage-backed securities, 
which are in turn based on valuations of the underlying 
mortgages, are very complicated, and include many factors 
extraneous to the market value of the property securing the 
mortgage.174 Thus, seizures of mortgages, even as opposed to 
seizures of the underlying property, generally present greater 
issues of valuation. Another dissimilarity is that both bankruptcy 
and foreclosure are by nature limited to circumstances in which the 
mortgagor was likely already unable to pay anyway, and certainly 
in the case of foreclosure, would already be in default. As the MRP 
proposal indicates, particularly if it passes muster in the courts, 
eminent domain may be used to seize performing loans owed by 
credit-worthy mortgagors. Whether these differences will have any 
substantial effect on investors’ perception of this risk is unknown. 
Even discounting the speculative views on future 
investor responses to the proposal, however, it is widely agreed 
                                                                                                                                     
may be appropriate to respond to market uncertainty or increased costs created by any 
movement to put in place such programs.”). 
 171 David H. Stevens, Industry Is Lining Up To Block Eminent Domain Laws, 
ARIZONA MORTGAGE LENDERS ASS’N (Sept. 8, 2013), http://www.azmortgagelenders.com/
industry-is-lining-up-to-block-eminent-domain-laws/. 
 172 “A mortgage cramdown allows you to reduce the principal balance of your 
mortgage to the value of your real estate. It may also allow you to reduce your 
mortgage interest rate.” Baran Bulkat, Mortgage Cramdowns in Chapter 13 
Bankruptcy, NOLO (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). Unless it is the homeowners’ primary 
residence, mortgages are subject to cramdown under the Bankruptcy Code. Id. “Pricing 
for a foreclosed home is [also] typically set at market value in an effort to move the 
property quickly,” but can be negotiated down. HOW TO BUY A FORECLOSED HOME, 
BANK OF AMERICA REAL ESTATE CENTER, http://foreclosures.bankofamerica.com/
how_to_buy_a_ foreclosed_ home (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). 
 173 This is briefly discussed in Part II, infra. 
 174 See INTRODUCTION TO ASSET-BACKED AND MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES, 
INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/bonds/12/introduction-
asset-backed-securities.asp, for a brief discussion of the valuation of these types of securities. 
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that any attempt to implement the proposal will result in 
“costly and lengthy litigation”175 “that could drag on for years, 
substantially undermining any benefit the [local government] 
may hope to achieve.”176 In response to Richmond’s approval of 
the program, litigation has already begun,177 and attorneys 
“have assured the [mortgage] industry that this unprecedented 
use of eminent domain raises multiple questions under the U.S. 
Constitution and state laws[, a]nd they could contest any 
seizure and keep the matter bottled up in the courts.”178 
Andrew Grossman of the Heritage Foundation has stated that 
“[local] officials would be reckless to discount these concerns.”179 
Indeed, the nation is watching to see how the Richmond 
litigation pans out.180 
Furthermore, and perhaps most significant to the 
purpose of this note, the dispersed nature of the property rights 
in mortgages means that the proposal will have a national or 
even international impact,181 and some investors are not the 
sort of large institutional investors who have been the face of 
the opposition in this debate. For example, some of the largest 
investors in mortgage-backed securities are pension funds.182 
Thus, the elderly and a broad range within the middle and 
working class public could also be negatively affected by this 
proposal.183 Even with diversified portfolios, if the use of 
eminent domain by one city triggers the use of eminent domain 
by many more, the impact could be of some significance. 
 
 175 Ghori, supra note 32. 
 176 Grossman, supra note 150. 
 177 Lazo, supra note 29. 
 178 Stevens, supra note 171. 
 179 Grossman, supra note 150. 
 180 Shaila Dewan, A City Invokes Seizure Laws to Save Homes, N.Y. TIMES (July 
29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/30/business/in-a-shift-eminent-domain-saves-
homes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“Richmond is about to become the first city in the 
nation to try eminent domain as a way to stop foreclosures. The results will be closely 
watched by both Wall Street banks . . . and a host of cities across the country that are 
considering emulating Richmond.”). 
 181 The FHFA has specifically expressed its concern with whether “critical 
issues surrounding the valuation . . . of complex contractual arrangements [referring to 
the mortgage-backed securitization trusts targeted by the proposal] that are traded in 
national and international markets” should be left to local governments and the courts. 
FHFA 2012 Notice, supra note 22. 
 182 Fogarty, supra note 33; Jacob Gaffney, DLA Piper: Richmond Eminent 
Domain Battle Just Beginning, HOUSING WIRE (Aug. 16, 2013, 2:48 PM), 
http://www.housingwire.com/articles/26249-dla-piper-richmond-eminent-domain-
battle-just-beginning. 
 183 See ABA Letter, supra note 37. 
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Indeed, MRP has a lineup of interested but cautious cities that 
are watching the situation in Richmond closely.184 
The foregoing illustrates the complexity of some of the 
major policy concerns created by the mortgage seizure 
proposal, and illuminates the extent of the power that has been 
placed in the hands of local governments. 
IV. WITH WHOM SHOULD THE FINAL SAY LIE?: A PROPOSAL 
FOR GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION 
One of the main problems created by entrusting local 
governments with the power to seize securitized mortgages is 
that they may not have reason to consider the implications of 
such a proposal beyond their jurisdictional borders. Moreover, 
even if they do, they may not have the necessary expertise or 
resources to make policy determinations which accurately take 
these considerations into account; thus, it might be unwise for 
states to grant local governments the autonomy to do so.185 
However, the issue remains as to how and by whom this power 
should be regulated. We can look to three main governmental 
units—the judiciary, the federal government, and the individual 
state governments—and two main sources of regulation—state 
legislation and the Constitution—for this oversight. 
A. The Judiciary and the Limit of Constitutional 
Protections 
The judiciary enforces constitutional limitations on the 
exercise of eminent domain. However, as discussed in Part II, 
the judiciary has categorically rejected reviewing or deciding on 
any issues of policy in determining the constitutionality of 
eminent domain proposals.186 There is wisdom in the court’s 
decision not to assess policy. In fact, this rule has come to play 
a fundamental role in the court’s view of the constitutionally 
 
 184 See Shaila Dewan, More Cities Consider Using Eminent Domain to Halt 
Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/16/business/
more-cities-consider-eminent-domain-to-halt-foreclosures.html?_r=0 (identifying Yonkers, 
New York; Newark, New Jersey; Pomona and Ontario, California; and some 
unidentified cities in Minnesota and Pennsylvania as cities showing strong interest in 
the proposal following in the wake of the approval by the City of Richmond).  
 185 See generally Guthrie, supra note 7. 
 186 Fideicomiso De La Tierra Del Caño Martin Peña v. Fortuno, 604 F.3d 7, 18 
(1st Cir. 2010) cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011); see also supra Part II. 
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mandated separation of powers between it and the political 
branches of the government.187 
Under the separation of powers doctrine, policy-making 
is constitutionally allocated to the exclusive purview of the 
legislature,188 largely because it requires expertise which the 
court may not have.189 Thus, the Court’s deference to the political 
branches in eminent domain proceedings should not be 
considered a shirking of the court’s responsibilities. Rather, it 
preserves the government’s authority to make the policy 
decision inherent in determining what constitutes a public 
use.190 For example, determining the public benefit of the 
mortgage proposal involves assessing whether or not the 
takings would actually address the goal—the stabilization of 
the housing market. Arguably, the executive branch, whether 
at the state or the federal level, is the more appropriate 
authority to make this determination.191 
 
 187 The separation of powers doctrine acts to protect the autonomy of each of 
the three branches of government to fulfill their constitutionally mandated duties: 
A fundamental principle of the American constitutional system is that 
governmental powers are divided among three separate and independent 
branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. The separation of powers 
doctrine provides that a department may not exercise powers not so 
constitutionally granted which from their essential nature do not fall within 
its division of governmental functions unless such powers are properly 
incidental to the performance by it of its own appropriate functions. Thus, the 
doctrine ensures that the three branches of government are distinct unto 
themselves and that they, exclusively, exercise the rights and responsibilities 
reserved unto them. 
16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 237 (2012). 
 188 Under the separation of powers doctrine: 
Article I of the Constitution entrusts the legislative power of the United 
States to the Congress, so that democratically elected representatives will 
determine national policy. Article II vests the executive power in the 
President, in the interest of unified administration by an elected officer. 
Article III places the judicial power in judges appointed for life and 
removable only for high crimes and misdemeanors, so that cases may be 
decided without fear of reprisal. 
M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. 
PA. L. REV. 603, 624 n.62 (2001) (quoting David P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers 
After Bowsher, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 19, 19). 
 189 See Richard Albert, The Constitutional Imbalance, 37 N.M.L. REV. 1, 24-
25 (2007). 
 190 “The eminent-domain power requires a degree of elasticity to be capable of 
meeting new conditions and improvements and the ever increasing necessities of society.” 
26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 3 (2012) (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 
(2005)). Indeed the mortgage crisis, and those aspects of the mortgage market that have 
made it difficult to address the issues faced in the crisis, may well be the kind of “new 
conditions and improvements” to which the Supreme Court was alluding. 
 191 See Albert, supra note 189, at 24-25. 
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The Court’s deference is also applied non-
discriminatorily across the levels of state or federal authority, 
providing no difference in degree of oversight over the policy-
making of any authorized governmental body—from a local 
township to a large federal agency. As a result, any form of policy-
monitoring must originate with the legislature, either through 
regulation by a state192 or federal193 agency, legislation limiting 
the scope of the eminent domain authority delegated to local 
governments, or legislation granting the states final review over 
the use of eminent domain to effect certain kinds of seizures.194 
B. The Pros and Cons of Agency Oversight: State v. Federal 
It is practically implausible that either the state or 
federal governments would expend the cost of creating and 
running new agencies solely for the purpose of regulating the 
use of eminent domain in as narrow a circumstance as the 
seizure of securities. However, there are several existing state 
and federal agencies that could easily take on this additional 
regulatory purpose, due to their already-existing regulatory 
functions pertaining to either securities generally or mortgages 
specifically. These institutions likely already have the 
necessary expertise to assess both the benefits and the dangers 
of the proposal, and the responsibility of considering the 
implications of the proposal on a broader market—either on the 
state or national level. 
The FHFA is the federal agency in the best position to 
take on such a regulatory role. The agency, which was set up to 
address the housing crisis, “has [in fact previously] resisted 
 
 192 Once provided for in legislation, state governments could grant the power 
of review over the use of eminent domain to a state agency. 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent 
Domain § 26 (2013). In effect, this grant of review has the effect of legislation 
promulgated to limit the exercise of eminent domain by entities to which the state has 
granted the power. 
 193 The U.S. Constitution has been read to generally prohibit the federal 
government from interfering with internal state affairs, unless otherwise mandated by 
the Constitution. The federal government could likely find the authority to regulate the 
use of eminent domain to take securitized mortgages, due to their dispersed ownership 
structure, under the commerce clause. The commerce clause permits the federal 
government to regulate interstate commerce. 7 BUS. & COM. LITIG. FED. CTS. § 85:72 
(3d ed.) (Dec. 2012). 
 194 As DLA Piper notes, “[a]bsent a state or federal legislative solution that 
says the City’s program is outside the bounds of eminent domain, the legality of the 
City’s Seizure Program will be determined in federal court.” Paul Hall, Isabelle Ord & 
Charles L. Deem, City Attempting to Seize Underwater Mortgages via Eminent Domain: 
Constitutional Objections, Potential Investor Losses, DLA PIPER REAL ESTATE LITIG. 
ALERT, Aug. 2013 at 2, available at http://www.dlapiper.com/city-attempts-to-seize-
underwater-mortgages-via-eminent-domain/. 
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mass refinancing and warned of the potential risk of doing 
so;”195 the agency has described the mortgage seizure program as 
“a desperate attempt to try to save a proposal that’s being rejected 
by smart policy-makers across the country.”196 However, the 
FHFA currently does not have the authority to directly prohibit 
the mortgage takings, and must rely on either taking action to 
discourage the proposal’s adoption, or on litigating the issue in 
the courts.197 The federal government could grant it this 
authority due to the inter-state commercial aspect of the 
mortgage market.198 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), on the 
other hand, is much less suitable. Asset-backed securities, such 
as those backed by mortgage loans, are “subject to the [SEC] 
and its rules and regulations as well [as] federal laws 
governing securities . . . .”199 Generally speaking, though, the 
SEC regulates the market through procedural and disclosure 
requirements for the sale and maintenance of the securities, 
meant to protect investors by holding banks accountable for 
keeping their investors informed.200 The SEC does not have 
experience, for example, valuing or dealing in mortgage-backed 
securities. Thus, SEC oversight may not be the most plausible 
option to oversee mortgage seizures. 
The benefit of dealing with the issue on the federal level 
is that national consequences would be given weight in the 
analysis of the appropriateness of the proposed mortgage 
takings, and implementation of takings rules would be 
 
 195 John, supra note 3 (citing David C. John, DeMarco Warns of the Dangers of 
Large-Scale Forgiving of Mortgage Debt, HERITAGE FOUND., FOUNDRY (Apr. 15, 2012), 
http://blog.heritage.org/2012/04/15/demarco-warns-of-the-dangers-of-large-scale-
forgiving-of-mortgage-debt. 
 196 Ghori, supra note 32 (quoting “Chris Katopis, executive director of the 
Association of Mortgage Investors, a Washington, D.C.-based lobbying group”). 
 197 Rick E. Rayl, Eminent Domain and Underwater Mortgages: Federal 
Government to Weigh in on Proposal, CAL. EMINENT DOMAIN REPORT, NOSSAMAN LLP 
(Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.californiaeminentdomainreport.com/tags/hr-1433/ (“FHFA’s 
concerns [regarding the mortgage seizure proposal] are not new, but it is significant 
that FHFA has given them a formal voice. On the other hand, it’s not entirely clear 
what FHFA might do about these ‘concerns.’ Unless the plan violates the federal 
constitution . . . the plan will be debated and ultimately litigated largely under state 
laws. FHFA has no jurisdiction to command states on how they should interpret their own 
laws.”); Yves Smith, FHFA Threatens to Kneecap Use of Eminent Domain to Condemn 
Mortgages, NAKED CAPITALISM (Aug. 9, 2012, 2:39 AM), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/
2012/08/fhfa-threatens-to-kneecap-use-of-eminent-domain-to-condemn-
mortgages.html#EIjgpFoTvSQX5r4w.99. 
 198 See supra note 193. 
 199 See Mortgage Securitization Process, L. OFF. GLENN F. RUSSELL, JR., 
http://foreclosuresinmass.com/mortgage_securitization.aspx (last visited Sept. 12, 2013). 
 200 See Asset Backed Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/
spotlight/dodd-frank/assetbackedsecurities.shtml (last visited Nov. 4, 2013). 
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consistent across states. The federal government would also 
have the opportunity to determine whether the problem could be 
best addressed by a national program. For example, there are 
currently existing but underutilized federal programs that allow 
borrowers to reduce their monthly payments without the negative 
externalities that will accompany the mortgage seizure 
proposal.201 Under these programs, such as the Home Affordable 
Refinance Program (HARP) and the Home Affordable 
Modification Program (HAMP), the federal government 
refinances qualifying loans, reducing the rate of interest on the 
loan.202 Thus, while these programs do not facilitate reduction of 
the face value (or principal) of the loan, they nonetheless “allow[ ]  
borrowers who are struggling with their payments to stay in their 
home while lowering their monthly payments.”203 Professor 
Hockett’s only argument against these programs, and HAMP 
specifically, is that they require “significant public expenditure” to 
be successful,204 but the MRP proposal threatens the potential for 
huge public expenditure as well.205 
The most valid argument levied against federal 
oversight is that federal bureaucracy often acts as a detriment 
to efficient action, and may even end in gridlock.206 Indeed, 
several have argued that both the HAMP and HARP 
programs have suffered from Congress’s inability to overcome 
its ideological divide as to how to best address the foreclosure 
crisis.207 Professor Hockett maintains that states are in a 
much more suitable position to respond to the foreclosure 
 
 201 For a list of the fourteen Federal Government Loan Modification Programs 
currently in existence, see Helping Responsible Homeowners Save Money Through Refinancing 
Before the Subcomm. on Hous., Transportation, & Community Development of the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 8 (2012) (statement of Dr. Anthony B. 
Sanders, Professor of Finance, George Mason University School of Management), available at 
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ 
ID=5826e6e7-1183-4b6c-a8a9-40d6bf792da1. 
 202 See Home Affordable Refinance Program, FREDDIE MAC, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/homeownership/ educational/harp_faq.html#a5 (last visited Nov. 
4, 2013); Home Affordable Modification Program, FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/
singlefamily/service/mha_modification.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).  
 203 MBA Letter, supra note 151.  
 204 Hockett Memo, supra note 18, at 26. 
 205 See supra Part II. 
 206 See generally Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, The Problem of 
Bureaucracy, in THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM AND THE PROBLEM OF 
BUREAUCRACY 1-11 (1994), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8632.pdf. 
 207 Hockett Memo, supra note 18, at 22; Douglas A. McIntyre, HAMP 
Program: A Failure or a Success?, 24/7 WALL ST. (May 18, 2010, 5:06 AM), 
http://247wallst.com/2010/05/18/hamp-program-a-failure-or-success/; Reiss, supra note 
121 (“The federal government’s responses to the current crisis in the housing markets 
have been half-hearted and at cross purposes.”). 
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crisis,208 and on this point, he is likely right. The trade-off of 
state oversight and regulation is the likely inattention to the 
national or even international consequences that may result 
from implementing such a proposal. However, it is arguable 
that states would be more efficient in promulgating regulation 
as the urgency of local issues would likely have greater 
political heft.209 Furthermore, the individual states would be 
better informed as to the unique affairs of their constituents. 
The states could subsume regulation of mortgage takings 
into the responsibilities of their own securities regulatory 
agencies,210 but this poses similarly high administrative costs as 
on the federal level. Arguably the most apt, and certainly the 
most direct, way the states may address the issue is by limiting 
the scope of the takings power delegated to cities and agencies,211 
to prevent them from effectuating the takings of complex 
securities either entirely, or without further state approval.212 
C. State Legislative Limitations: Entire Ban v. Requirement 
of State Approval 
It is unclear which of these two choices a state would or 
should make. However, there are some basic considerations the 
states should bear in mind should they choose to limit the 
eminent domain power they have delegated to local 
governments. Both options operate to reduce administrative 
costs to different degrees, but the choice of one or the other 
arguably depends on the comparative weight the states place on 
competing values: (1) the reduced oversight over decisions of 
local government afforded by granting them the unrestricted 
right to exercise eminent domain, and (2) the ability to regulate 
 
 208 Hockett Memo, supra note 18, at 26. 
 209 Id. at 28-29; see also Promoting Local Control and States Rights, CONG. W. 
CAUCUS, http://www.westerncaucus.pearce.house.gov/promoting-local-control-and-states-
rights/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2013). 
 210 Each state has a securities regulatory office. The list of these agencies for 
each state can be found on the website of the North American Securities Administrators 
Association. Contact Your Regulator, N. AM. SECS. ADM’RS ASSN., http://www.nasaa.org/about-
us/contact-us/contact-your-regulator/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2013). 
 211 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain, supra note 5, at § 23 (“In delegating the 
power of eminent domain, the state may exercise a certain control . . . .”). 
 212 For example, in the Joint Powers Agreement creating the Homeownership 
Protection Program Joint Powers Authority, referenced several times in this note, the 
power of eminent domain granted to the agency is specifically withheld from seizure of 
residential homes. See JPA Agreement, supra note 116, at 1, 8. Arguably, the states 
could control the use of eminent domain for the purpose of taking mortgages or any 
other form of security by simply limiting it all together so that such considerations 
would have to be dealt with on the state legislative level. 
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local policy making.213 The former value is, in essence, based on a 
concern about costs—the financial cost and the cost in time that 
is saved by giving local governments autonomy over the policy 
decision of whether or not to use eminent domain. 
If the states only value the cost of monitoring, they will 
either strip the local governments of the power to use eminent 
domain to seize mortgages, or continue to allow them 
unrestricted use of the power. A downside to restricting the 
power altogether is that the state would nevertheless have to 
bear the cost of reviewing and also, if it ever saw fit, 
potentially implementing any proposal for the use of eminent 
domain to seize mortgages. Thus, the most logical choice 
would be the current one—to leave the power mostly 
unrestricted and to entrust these policy evaluations in their 
entirety to the local governments. Most states, though, will 
also likely value their ability to review these decisions, 
particularly in light of the mortgage proposal and the 
widespread response from the financial industry. As a result, 
legislatively retaining the right to review these decisions will 
be the most attractive option. 
The means of implementation aside, however, direct 
state intervention has two powerful advantages to the other 
modes of regulation. It avoids the additional administrative 
costs of having a regulatory body oversee the process, as well as 
circumvents issues of federal intervention in state affairs. Most 
importantly, it takes the autonomy of policymaking on complex 
and potentially highly impactful proposals out of the hands of 
local governments and places it in a body that has greater 
resources and purview to assess the wisdom of the proposals. 
CONCLUSION 
While this note has focused on the potential problems 
that may result from the implementation of the mortgage 
seizure proposal, it neither supports nor opposes the proposal. 
Rather, it is building a case for the level and kind of authority 
that should have the final say in approving or disapproving a 
proposal to use eminent domain to seize complex securities. This 
note principally argues that a proposal to seize mortgages 
requires greater supervision from state governments, rather than 
the more deferential judgment afforded by judicial oversight 
through the application of Fifth Amendment takings law. 
 
 213 This value scheme is introduced supra Part I. 
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There is, without doubt, enormous value to the goal of 
the MRP proposal. Both those who endorse the proposal and 
those who criticize it agree that the mortgage crisis is 
economically crippling for the areas it has most greatly affected 
and that it must be addressed.214 The mortgage seizure 
proposal has reasonably been held up as a novel opportunity 
for local governments to address the mortgage foreclosure crisis 
in the face of relative deference from Congress.215 However, the 
reality of the crisis and the opportunity the mortgage seizure 
proposal provides do not negate potential negative externalities 
created by the exercise of eminent domain to take mortgage-
backed securities.216 
As Part III discussed, the complex nature of 
mortgage-backed securities, and the market of which they 
are a part, creates added layers of policy considerations 
different from those a municipality would usually encounter 
in determining whether to use eminent domain to take land. 
Particularly concerning are the far reaching effects mortgage 
seizures would have, which is part and parcel of the 
national, and potentially international, market of which 
most mortgages have become a part. Indeed, as Part III 
illustrated, the dispersed ownership structure of securitized 
mortgages (of which most American mortgages are a part) 
both creates the problem the mortgage seizure proposal is 
attempting to address—the prevention of principal 
reduction—and adds a layer of complexity that makes the 
proposal potentially dangerous to implement. The power to 
make decisions of this magnitude should not be liberally 
granted to municipal authorities, but rather should be 
carefully scrutinized and monitored by a higher-level 
authority equipped with the expertise and charged with the 
responsibility of taking into account the impact of the 
negative externalities of such a program on the securities, 
mortgage, and housing markets. This note concludes that the 
 
 214 For example, California’s lieutenant governor, Gavin Newsom, while not 
“explicitly endors[ing] the eminent domain proposal,” told the San Bernardino County 
Sun in a telephone interview that, “[t]he economy in our state is not going to rebound 
until we address the number one thing holding us back, and that’s these homes that 
are underwater[.]” Edwards, supra note 84 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 215 John W. Schoen, Governments Mull Radical Solution to Underwater Mortgages: 
Seize Them, NBC NEWS, available at http://www.certifiedforensicloanauditors.com/
articles/08.12/governments-mull-radical-solution-to-underwater-mortgages.html (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2013) (quoting Gregory Deveraux, administrator for San Bernardino 
County, saying that “[f]ederal programs have not been very successful at all, and the 
private programs have been of limited help”). 
 216 See MBA Letter, supra note 151. 
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authorities best equipped to address these concerns are the 
states, either through directly limiting the power delegated 
or by retaining the power to review. 
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